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Private Key d Related Attacks

d Leak attack

Attack principle

First, when d is leaked, we can naturally decrypt all encrypted messages. We can even decompose the modulus N. The basic principle is as follows

We know ed \equiv 1 \bmod \varphi(n), then \varphi(n) | k=ed-1. Obviously k is an even number, we can make k=2^tr, where r is odd and t is not less than 1. So for any number g that is relative to N, we have g^k \equiv 1 \bmod n. Then z=g^{\frac{k}{2}} is the quadratic root of the modulo N. Then we have

$$

z^2 \equiv 1 \bmod p \

z^2 \equiv 1 \bmod q

$$

Furthermore, we know that the equation has the following four solutions, the first two are

$$

x equiv PM1 N way $$

The last two are \pm x, where x satisfies the following conditions

$$

x equiv 1 p \ way x equiv -1 q way $$

Obviously, z=g^{\frac{k}{2}} satisfies the latter condition, and we can calculate gcd(z-1,N) to decompose N.

Tools

Use the following tools to perform calculations directly

2017 HITB - hack in the card II

The second smart card sent to us has been added some countermeasures by that evil company. They also changed the public key(attachments -> publickey.pem). However it seems that they missed something......

Can you decrypt the following hex-encoded ciphertext this time?

```

> 016d1d26a470fad51d52e5f3e90075ab77df69d2fb39905fe634ded81d10a5fd10c35e1277035a9efabb66e4d52fd2d1eaa845a93a4e0f1c4a4b70a0509342053728e89e977cfb9920d5150393fe9dcbf86bc63914166546d5ae04d83631594703db59a628de3b945f566bdc5f0ca7bdfa819a0a3d7248286154a6cc5199b99708423d0749d4e67801dff2378561dd3b0f10c8269dbef2630819236e9b0b3d3d8910f7f7afbbed29788e965a732efc05aef3194cd1f1cff97381107f2950c935980e8954f91ed2a653c91015abea2447ee2a3488a49cc9181a3b1d44f198ff9f0141badcae6a9ae45c6c75816836fb5f331c7f2eb784129a142f88b4dc22a0a977

```

This question is a question that follows 2017 HITB - hack in the card I. We use openssl to view the public key of publickey.pem and find that its N is the same as the N of the previous question, and the N of the previous question, e,d is known. Thus, you can directly use the above rsatool.py to get p, q, and calculate e from the e of this problem to get the plain text.

Wiener's Attack

Attack conditions

When d is small (d<\frac{1}{3}N^{\frac{1}{4}}), an attacker can use Wiener's Attack to get the private key.

Attack principle

Tools

Comprehensive example

2016 HCTF RSA1

Here we take the RSA 1 - Crypto So Interesting in the 2016 HCTF as an example, [source code link] (https://github.com/Hcamael/ctf-library/tree/master/RSA1).

First, bypass the proof part of the program, and you can bypass it with almost random data.

Second, let's analyze the specific code part. The program gets the flag according to our token. Here we directly use the token provided in the source code.

    print "This is a RSA Decryption System"

    print "Please enter Your team token: "

    token = raw_input()

    try:

        flag = get_flag(token)

        assert len(flag) == 38

    except:

        print "Token error!"

        m_exit(-1)

Next we first know n=pq, let's take a closer look at how this e, d is obtained.

    p=getPrime(2048)

    q=getPrime(2048)

    n = p * q

    e, d = get_ed(p, q)

    print "n: ", hex(n)

print &quot;e:&quot;, hex (e)

get_ed function is as follows

def get_ed(p, q):

    k = cal_bit(q*p)

phi_n = (p-1) * (q-1)
r = random.randint (10, 99)
    while True:

        u = getPrime(k/4 - r)

        if gcd(u, phi_n) != 1:

            continue

t = invmod (u, phi_n)
e = pi_b (t)
if gcd (e, phi_n) == 1:
            break

d = invmod (e, phi_n)
    return (e, d)

It can be seen that the number of bits we get is less than a quarter of the number of bits in n, which is almost the same as Wiener's Attack. And we calculated u, t, e, d also meet the following conditions

$$

\begin{align*}

out & equals 1 bmod varphi (n) Others & equiv 1 bt \ way ed &\equiv 1 \bmod \varphi(n)

\end{align*}

$$

According to the conditions given in the title, we already know n, e, bt.

So first we can know e according to the second formula above. At this time, you can use the first formula for Wiener's Attack to get u. Then we can use the private key index to leak the attack to decompose N to get p, q. Then we can get d.

First we bypassed proof and got N, e. The encrypted flag is as follows

n:  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

is:
flag:  0x2517d1866acc5b7b802a51d6251673262e9e6b2d0e0e14a87b838c2751dee91e4ea29019b0a7877b849fddf9e08580d810622db538462b529412eba9d0f8a450fe1889021c0bbd12a62ccc3fff4627b1dbdebec3a356a066adc03f7650722a34fe41ea0a247cb480a12286fffc799d66b6631a220b8401f5f50daa12943856b35e59abf8457b2269efea14f1535fb95e56398fd5f3ac153e3ea1afd7b0bb5f02832883da46343404eb44594d04bbd254a9a35749af84eaf4e35ba1c5571d41cab4d58befa79b6745d8ecf93b64dd26056a6d1e82430afbff3dbc08d6c974364b57b30c8a8230c99f0ec3168ac4813c4205d9190481282ae14f7b94400caff3786ed35863b66fefcffbef1ad1652221746a5c8da083987b2b69689cf43e86a05ce4cf059934716c455a6410560e41149fbcf5fcea3c210120f106b8f6269b9a954139350626cf4dcb497ce86264e05565ec6c6581bf28c643bb4fab8677148c8034833cedacb32172b0ff21f363ca07de0fa2882ac896954251277adc0cdd0c3bd5a3f107dbebf5f4d884e43fe9b118bdd51dc80607608670507388ae129a71e0005826c7c82efccf9c86c96777d7d3b9b5cce425e3dcf9aec0643f003c851353e36809b9202ff3b79e8f33d40967c1d36f5d585ac9eba73611152fc6d3cf36fd9a60b4c621858ed1f6d4db86054c27828e22357fa3d7c71559d175ff8e8987df

Secondly, use the following method to get Wiener's Attack to get u, as follows

if __name__ == "__main__":

bt =
e =
    t = gmpy2.invert(e, bt)

    n = 0x4b4403cd5ac8bdfaa3bbf83decdc97db1fbc7615fd52f67a8acf7588945cd8c3627211ffd3964d979cb1ab3850348a453153710337c6fe3baa15d986c87fca1c97c6d270335b8a7ecae81ae0ebde48aa957e7102ce3e679423f29775eef5935006e8bc4098a52a168e07b75e431a796e3dcd29c98dab6971d3eac5b5b19fb4d2b32f8702ef97d92da547da2e22387f7555531af4327392ef9c82227c5a2479623dde06b525969e9480a39015a3ed57828162ca67e6d41fb7e79e1b25e56f1cff487c1d0e0363dc105512d75c83ad0085b75ede688611d489c1c2ea003c3b2f81722cdb307a3647f2da01fb3ba0918cc1ab88c67e1b6467775fa412de7be0b44f2e19036471b618db1415f6b656701f692c5e841d2f58da7fd2bc33e7c3c55fcb8fd980c9e459a6df44b0ef70b4b1d813a57530446aa054cbfb9d1a86ffb6074b6b7398a83b5f0543b910dcb9f111096b07a98830a3ce6da47cd36b7c1ac1b2104ea60dc198c34f1c50faa5b697f2f195afe8af5d455e8ac7ca6eda669a5a1e3bfbd290a4480376abd1ff21298d529b26a4e614ab24c776a10f5f5d8e8809467a3e81f04cf5d5b23eb4a3412886797cab4b3c5724c077354b2d11d19ae4e301cd2ca743e56456d2a785b650c7e1a727b1bd881ee85c8d109792393cc1a92a66b0bc23b164146548f4e184b10c80ec458b776df10405b65399e32d657bc83e1451

    solve(n, t)

The solve function is the function of the corresponding Wiener's Attack.

We got u as follows

➜ rsa-wiener-attack git: (master) ✗ python RSAwienerHacker.py
Testing Wiener Attack

Hacked!

('hacked_d = ', mpz(404713159471231711408151571380906751680333129144247165378555186876078301457022630947986647887431519481527070603810696638453560506186951324208972060991323925955752760273325044674073649258563488270334557390141102174681693044992933206572452629140703447755138963985034199697200260653L))

-------------------------

Hacked!

('hacked_d = ', mpz(404713159471231711408151571380906751680333129144247165378555186876078301457022630947986647887431519481527070603810696638453560506186951324208972060991323925955752760273325044674073649258563488270334557390141102174681693044992933206572452629140703447755138963985034199697200260653L))

-------------------------

Hacked!

('hacked_d = ', mpz(404713159471231711408151571380906751680333129144247165378555186876078301457022630947986647887431519481527070603810696638453560506186951324208972060991323925955752760273325044674073649258563488270334557390141102174681693044992933206572452629140703447755138963985034199697200260653L))

-------------------------

Hacked!

('hacked_d = ', mpz(404713159471231711408151571380906751680333129144247165378555186876078301457022630947986647887431519481527070603810696638453560506186951324208972060991323925955752760273325044674073649258563488270334557390141102174681693044992933206572452629140703447755138963985034199697200260653L))

-------------------------

Hacked!

('hacked_d = ', mpz(404713159471231711408151571380906751680333129144247165378555186876078301457022630947986647887431519481527070603810696638453560506186951324208972060991323925955752760273325044674073649258563488270334557390141102174681693044992933206572452629140703447755138963985034199697200260653L))

Then use RsaConverter and u,t,n to get the corresponding p and q. as follows

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

Then we go directly to get d, and then we can recover the plaintext.

    p = 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

    q = 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

    if p * q == n:

        print 'true'

Phin = (p - 1) * (q - 1)
d = gmpy2.invert (e, phin)
    cipher = 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

    flag = gmpy2.powmod(cipher, d, n)

    print long_to_bytes(flag)

Get flag

true

hctf{d8e8fca2dc0f896fd7cb4cb0031ba249}

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